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CBC: This tape, which will be recorded on 24 June 1984 (1985) at 11:00 a.m., 
consists of an interview of Cecil Currey with former CIA Director, William E. 
Colby. 
I appreciate very much vour takinq time out of your schedule to meet 
with. me today. 
First there is a real simple question, Mr. Colby. When they talk 
about an agent under deep cover. What does deep cover mean? 
WEC: Means non-official. Essentially, it means under private cover, 
CBC: Could you give me an example? 
WEC: Work for the XYZ Export Corporation. 
CBC: And that would be opposed to just plain cover? 
WEC: Cover is any kind of thing, whether it's really serious- or not. Manv-
people in embassies are known to certain people and even tot-he local i_ntelliqence 
authorities •.• 
CBC: Well, what kind of cover would this be? General Lansdale told me tha,t 
when he went out to the Philippines as an intelligence officer, he went to 






Well, as an official of the U.S. qovernment. 
Uhn, hunh. 
Yeah. That would not be deep. 
Uhn, hunh. 
That would not be. 
CBC: Uhn, hunh. OK. 
Can you tell me when you were oosted to the CIA Saigon des:k? 
WEC: '58. I left Italy after five years a,nd went to the desk for a, couple 
of months, to Vietnam. I arrived in Vietnam on TET 159. February, April, wna,tever 
it was. 
I 
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enc: It was a little quieter than later, a more famous TET? 
WEC: Yeah-. 
CBC: How did you meet Ed Lansdale? 
WEC: Well, I think the Urst time I met him wa
s when he- vis:tted 'Vietni"l,1'{} 
a.t the end of the Eisenhower regime and on behalf of tfie 
new; Kennedy a,dn,li_nist'l'.:at;tcm , 
and he arrived ••. I heard of him and his activities in the
 Philippines- oefore-, 
but I also knew that he was not associated with the Agency 
at the time. He had 
some job ove:r- in Defense, which had him dealing with the 
Agency; but as I recall, 
I ha,dn't dealt with him particularly at that stage. 
CBC; would you tell me what kinds of things you had h
ea.rd about him before-
you met him? 
WEC; Well, J heard tha,t he ha,d a great empathy for th
e Asia.ns-. His rela.ti:cm-
been one , 
ship with Magsaysay had / a very successful one, very close, -
supportivei2 >Ne haet:been 
an idea man, man for bright ideas for political activitie
s. I also knew that 
he was in Vietnam in the '54 ...'. 55 period. I didn't know too
 much_ about hi_m, 
although I knew that he had some very good relationships 
with- Diem and had been 
supportive of Diem a t a period when the United States go
vernment had its 
doubts whether it should stay with the French or go with
 the Nationalis:ts·. 
And Lansdale had been assigned the job of liaison with th
e Nationalists. Of; 
course the Vietnamese, Diem ... Nhu, the president's broth
er, was my main contact. 
He was a little dubious of the value of Lansdale '·s contri
butions and the specific 
ideas that he came up with. 
CBC: When you say the president's brother, you are re
ferring to Robert 
Kennedy? 
WEC: No, Nqo Dinh Nhu. 
CBC: Oh, ok, ok. 
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WEC: President ... 
CBC: President Diem '·s brother, ok, ok. 
WEC: Was· a little dubious of it, but I had the feeling that he. was also 
protecting his own position as the Counselor to President Diem, and so con-
sequently it was never indicated while he was around, t ha,'1: it was marginal 
contribution. I don't think his contribution was marginal at all. He was 
very significant in bringing American support to Diem and keepi,ng Arneri:ca,n 
support behind Diem at a time when he was going out, smashing the sect armies 
and things like that. 
But when I met him on his trip in '60, ' 61, Januar y '61 it was, he.. 
had been sent by the new administration •. , 
Sorry. 
CBC: You said that when you met him in Januar y of 1 61 • • 
WEC; '61. He was over to look at the situation fo;i:i the new: a,dlgi,ni:stra,ti:on 
because the. new· administration had expressed an interest in counter insurgency , 
was concerned a,bout the direction of events in Vietna;m, which. by then i,t was 
obvious that the Communists were building up their forces: and building up tliei';i,-
attack on the government of South_ Vietnam , And he came ove:I'.' to get a looka.t 
it. He was particularly, I think, a little dubious about the CIA, role, becaa,se 
he was- a li.ttle questioning how· we were going into these. various· rural experiments-
that we were going into, of organizing local defense and local activities. 
CBC: CIDG was· a CIA operation? 
WEC ; That was· still a CIA operation at that time, and , you know, some. othex;, 
comparable expe.riments· we were running. A,nd I think he was· curious • • , he was: a 
little curious as to whethe:I'.' they were real. But he. had some- good contacts 
SJ.de 1 - Inte.:i:;vt.ew with William E. Colbv, former CIA Director, a
t his: home -
24 June 1985 - page 4 
WEC: on the Vietnamese side; the President obviously; I thin
k he saw Nhu; 
TA(.(.o..n 
and he particularly took a trip down the Delta with 'l'fie,fia. (013? ➔ 
-Defense 
-rA t,c.. o.. ..-i 
Ministe.r at the time, was Secretarv of State, '±'h:emh (n. I can't remember 
what he was. I'll think of it. And I think he was convinced by
 what the 
Vietnamese told hi.m that we were doing, and that we seemed to be
 very supoortive 
a.nd that our experiments offered some verv interesting potential
. 
CBC: Uhn, hunh. 
WEC; So I think he went home with a much more positive 
attitude than Wflen he. 
had arrived, Of course, we were treating him a little bit with 
kid gloves 
because the rumor circuit ha.d that he might become the new Amba
ssador. So we 
were obviously presenting ourselves as well a.s we could, and try
ing to convince 
him that some of. our exoeriments were in the right direction. T
hev were t:r:ying 
ta build rural secur.;itv rather tha.n taking the militarv approach
 to the · wa.x: . 
CBC: How well do you think vou actually were able to achieve






Civilia.nized a,Pp;t:oa.ch rather than a military one . 
Well, I think the major contribution that we made wa,& tha,t our e
xoe.ri-
ments beqan to interest Ngo Dinh Nhu, that with some alte:t;ation 
of some of the. 
de.tails, he essentially took it as the strategy for the strategi
c hamlets. 
And tu:('ned it into a nationwise program wlaich, I think, worked q
uite well durlng 
1 62 until the Buddhists trouble arose in '63. At that time , the 
whole thino 
fell apart. But they were on the oroper strateoy and both Diem 
and Nhu had 
selected strateoic hamlets as the right way to fioht the oeoole.s 
war; to build 
up the local level, to build securitv and communi.tv identificatio
n a.nd participa-
tion . / 
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'CBC: Well, it sounds like the sort of thing that Lansdale had not only 
urged earlier on when he was there full time, but that he had worked on in
 
the Philippines also. 
WEC: Yeah., well in the Philippines he was more ... he was dealinq
 with_ 
an established electoral system, and the question there was how to get Pr
es;tdent 
Maqsavsav elected and then how to get some of these politically oriented 
pro-
qrams goinq in the countrvside . to face up to the Huks. In Vietnam you di
d not 
have much. of a political structure: you had a much. more. direct confrontatj
:on 
in the villages, and it needed rural orqanization from the bottom up, rath
er 
than proqra,ms from the top down. And that's what we were trying to develo
p 
out of these strate.gic hamlet programs. Ngo Dinh- Nhu got a little over-
pre.ssurized on itwanting to achieve very rapid results verv quickly and 
that 
created a little ... he used to rail aqainst the bureaucrats all the. time., 
tii/.;\.t 
theiy would ·· 1ie to him about the progress and so forth. He knew tiiey were
 
lvinq to him, that, you know, like a good strategy, once vou ha,ve the riqh
:t 
idea, then pus.h it hard, and accept the fact that there are qoing to be 
failinqs in it. You correct those, but you don't abandon the- strategy. You 
don't PUS.Sy foot the strateqy just because you have failings i_n it, but you 
push it harder. And that was his concept, and I think he was· right , 
CBC: You spoke about Nhu heinq concerned about the bureaucracy tha,t w
asn't 
pushinq hi.s prog;r;-am well enough_ Well, Lansdale told me once that he. fee
ls 
perhaps 
that/one of the most essenti.al thinqs to have been done. in Vietnam wa,s ac
tually 





That undei;- the French., .. 
Yea,h. 
CBC: •.• they had such low level positions ... 
J 
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WEC: Yeah. Well, you see, the Problem was when the Communists took over 
;tn North Vietnam, they drove into exile or murdered most of the previous 
bureaucracy, They had a very bad time for three or four years. They, finally 
created their own bureaucracy, their own manaqement structure , When Diem 
took over, he was so weak, literally; he only controlled the space of: hi~:t 
palace. grounds, that he wasn't about to he able to eliminate bureaucracy. 
and what he did was absorb it with all its French- failings. And then in a 
gradual process, set UP a national administration on the. model of the one, 
that was set up in France, immediate post-war era from which people like 
Giscard D'Es:taing came, and his thouqht then was to use the American educational 
system, put there in the American Civil Service concept, to develop a new· 
bureaucracy and gradually replace the old one and not destabilize the. situati.on 
totally while he was trying to put a new one in. Nhu's concevt in the strategic 
hamlet was quite different, and I think, very interesting in that he was· com-
plaini.ng _,- about the class structure in the bureaucrats, and the establishment, 
the colonial establishment, that ran the country. Of course, he was a part of 
it, hut he was still complaininq, you see. And I thought, verv well . His 
concept of strateqic hamlet was less a securitv matter than a qeneratinq 
factor for a new base for a new Vietnam, He felt that the new leade:t;"ship of 
Vietnam would come out of these role communities if you could just get them 
f unctioning and organized, then the new leaders would come up with. real 
Vietnamese ideas· rather than French colonial ideas on how the country should 
be run. And it 1 s a very intere.stinq social expe:t;"iment. It was conducted 
during a war and obviously had obstacles to it greater than we could handle. 
But this is not an abnormal thing. Of course, other countries.· have tried 
thi.s same kind of reqeneration • • • to try t o generate a new fundamental national 
base for their country. 
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CBC: Well, when Lansdale came over on this mission, how long di:d he vis:-:t.t 
the country at that point? 
WEC: About two weeks. Something like that. 
CBC: And did you have pretty much day-by-day contact with- him? 
WEC: No, we had one session and then a couple more, maybe, One or two 
more. And he would see some of our officers out in the field; that sort' of · 
thinq. I deliberately didn't try to take hold of him, because. I wanted to 
just present our case and t hen let him make up his own mind. Actuallv the 
thing that supported our case more than anvthing were the Vietnamese , They 
felt that it wa s working. 
CBC: Would you sav that as a result of your work and his, tha t you are 
friends or speakinq acquaintances or ••• 
WEC: We ' r e • . . we 1 re colleagues who agree on a great number of thin.gs about 
how t he nature. of the war out t here was more a politi cal war than a soldi er's 
war. we don 't see each other t hat often, but we a re quite fr;~endly when we 
see each othe:c. I hav-e great r e spect fc,:r him and r think he thinks my programs 
ma.de a certain amount of sense. 
CBC; lie l:,kes you. 
WE,... ~- Well ••• 
CBC: I was with him yesterd~y and ••• 
WEC; we.11, I think we both like each other, but we don I t ever see. ea,dL 
other that much. :I; fec.l very ·.-,a~ anr1 fr~_endly -=tnd ver:; su:;;:po~tive of him. 
J''m snre t-hat he has things tha,-t I did that he kind of questi:pns:, and I a,m 
R-Url? thc,t there a.re thtng~ th;;t he dicl, that I kind of quest:ion , But, you 
know·, that ts incidenta.l, f rom a f r iendship, The main linP--, tota, l a,g,,.ee.rnent- . 
CRC: He said tha;t. you had written a oiece cr1lled "The Ten Great Spies" ""or 
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·CBC: something like t hat . 
WEC: nh, ::,eah, yeah.. I p11t htm in it . 
CBC: YP,ah, tlv>t 1 s what he was saying. Do you happen to ha,ve a copy o f 
that around? I wouldn't want you to jump u~ at this instant, but if you have 
a copy I wouJd very much enjoy borrowing it long enough to qet a Xer ox . 
(pause as looks f or paper ) 
mentioned before 
WEC: The name of this Vietnamese r/wa.s Nguyen (.sp?) Thua,n • . T K u A N. 
He was Secretary of State at that t i me ; he later became Minis ter of Defense. 
CBC: Ok, shif ting subjects . I managea to qet from the Air For ce Lansdal e's 
service record . The thing , as you can imagine, is about th;,t t hick . And having 
gone through it, I am puzzled, because •. . 
WEC: How did he become a Mrl.jor General? 
CBC: Well, that's part of i t. T-!e doesn't pilot an a.i !'.'pl1me; he is not a 
maintenance offi<::er; he's gone to only one Air Force Stats School, although 
he was asked to teach at the National War College and places like that; he's 
never commanded a Wing or any of the ot he:r. Ai r Force no:i::mal things; yet, he is 
the ve ... y model of a monern Major General. 
(Laughter) 
WEC: He • .. now the military do throw up people like this. They are a little 
off the bea t, the normal l ine, but I can think of a number of them. Geor ge 
Benson .- . actually Vern Wal ters, our new A.mbrissa_dor to the Unit ed Nati ons, is· a. 
specific example. He never commanded a squad , and ye t he, ended as a. Lt. Gen'l'.'a,l. 
He wa,s one of two graduates of the Officers Candidate Sch0ol who got to be 
sta rs . 
CBC: W~ll. 
WEC: And he did it by his ma.gni f;i. cant comma,nd of langua ges 
,--' 
, h.ts 
abili ty to be in exactly the right place c1t the right time, t o be a. very 
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' WEC : loyal a nd effective off j cer, dealing with fore igners, Brazilians , 
Italians .- French, what<=wer , and a very good deputy to me in the CI A. J ust a 
f i ne intelligence officer, but not ,,rhat you would call a regaular Army soldt er . 
Ge0rge Benson was ver y prominent in Indonesia n affairs as mi litary attache 
there , got to know everybo0y in Indonesia. Came 1p, he got his star i n 
Vi etnam where he harl a brignde for awhile i n order to punch his t;tcke.+:s, hut 
he's ret ired now; but. there .:,,re a nu!"lber of others o f that sort tha t come 
up through the machine . And Lansdale obviously, he had a very unique ont.r ;thu-
tion to be mr1de to our country , not jus t to the Air Force1 and he found his 
:r-eally most -fruitful cont-r, ibutions in , the Ma~saysay period, t be Di em :".)e :dod, 
and la er a n Lodge was ver y hi gh on him, you know, when he was ove;(' ;tn Vi etnam 
with Lodge • .• 
CBC: Uhn hunh. 
WEC : And when he worked in t he :Pent agon in various of thos e staff jobs, 
wher eever they all are, he, of course, was highly regarded b~t the Kennedys 
and so forth. 
CBC: It's very ini:eresti.ng. Well, I know how military promot ion bor1.rds 
work. When they pull out his OER's te> look a t to determi ne whether to pro!nOte 
hiTl'I, and it says, work classified under nat ional security. 
WEC ~ well, veah, but then something will come in from the top. 
CBC: 
WEC: •.. says, oome on now ••• 
CBC : Well, rar+-icularly given tJ,e f act that r: think- he's tota1ly frank 
w-t th me when he s ays he neve'!" really cared a_bm_~t r;;ink .. • 
WEC: No, I don't t hink he cared about it a. t a,J l . That was the l ec'\st of 
his problems . No , he was very mur.h interested in fu.e work t o be done. 
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CBC: It's also obvious from l ook.in0 at the service record and seeino who 
si']Ils the ~eriodic fitness ceports thcJt he was workiDg fnr the CTA. 
For. cer tain parts of -the t-im0 • 
CRC: Except . .. :i: don't think L-=msn.ale' s a. li.=ir. 
Oh., no. 
CBC: Yet, he says he never ••. this is probably technical . ,,he was never a. 
member . . • I think he says a rnemher . .. I was never a men,ber of the rIA. 
wpo was seconded 
WEC: Well , th.=it's true. He was like Dick Stillwe11 / tn CI~ for awhi,l~ 
we badly needed some officers. And he worked there a couple of yea.rs a,nd 
worked there, but not a member of .. . in other words, he sttll r etainP.d his 
assianed 
A:r.my r ank, his: Anny identif:;i:cr1tinn. Lansdell certainly was / to work 
when 
w-:i.th CIA which was a period :in '54 and a period i_n Magsaysa~, time, those two •.. 
CBC: TThn hunh 
• •• were 
WE,-,. ~- /t'l:-..e only t-ime I think he ~-rorked for CIA directly and he was on detail_ 




t0 the Army War Colleqe. Uhn huhl'l. 
Ye.::i.h. Yeah. But that wouldn't m;ike him ri membe!'.' of -the C'IA ., no. 
Well, he was alsn a member of a thing called the Office of Policy 
Coordination. That's what sent him out to As5a in the firs:t place, Wh:i:ch is 
a part of CIA. 
It bec:am9 a part nf CTA. When it 1•1as set np in, that -.:-?ould h"lve been 
40'---
CBC: I think it was '48 _ 
WEr.: It was one of these things that we do •. . it was under the joint: manage-
ment nf CTA and the State Derartment. 
CBC: Uhn hunh. 
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WEC: WelJ, it used CIA financi11.g, -Fin;and al help. And when Bee:l_l e }{~ Smit h_ 
bP.came head of CIA in '52, he said he wasn't- going t:o have the thing a'l'.'ound 
unless h e co~manden it. . , ... (unint,;,lligible) whPre BeEil- l e )('~ Smith spoke 
a bou t thing s· l i ke that, and so they t r anqferred it to CIA. '!'hey spi=mt a long 
time i nt,,gr;ating it with the more t-raditiona l i n telli<_;ence side, in-1:elligi:>nce 
coller:ti0n si·de nf CIA. And that, you know; it was a bureaucratic team ove'.':'.' 
s i de 
many yi=>ars depenn_ing on whether you ca!!le ou t of: thP act-.ion J Q;!'.' the coJ lec t i on. 
CBC: Now, t he~e wa s OPC and there was 0S0; 6-Ffice of Speci~l Orer~tinns, 
Of fice of Politic Coordin~tion 
WEC : The names don't mean a nything . 
CBC: Uhn hunh . 
WEC: But when he ·was i.n . . • working fol;' T,Qd<]e in '54-S r I think i _t wa,s ; he 
was not work ing fo r CIA. 
CBC: Right. Yeah. 
I quess if anythi ng _- he was working fO!c St.=i,te Depr1vt."'nen-l:. He ha,d th.e 
rank o:e Minj_ster. 
WEC: He prot-c\bl y. , .yeah, he prohably wa s assumed by th.e State just the wa y, 
"t>7hen I want sent out there I wa,q tur ned over a.nd be ga,n to wo:rik. :e'or AID. 
CR-: He says that wa.s: a ver y uncomfortal:l,le :-eri od in h.1':: s life, becau se t-he. 
-mi:.litary n0 longer trusted h i m b e cause he was now State, and the State didn't 
trust him because he wa s p a st milita.ry wi th jus.t kind of a cou.r te.sy ;rank of 
Min:tster, 
WEC : Well, you hay e t o r".:'a,l .ize. t:ha,t; ;r: mean, w~ ha,~ i:it t-ha,+: period be.tween 
two and,.,.and the. bureaucracies were really intense o:n their perogat;i:ves 
and their. " .and Lansdale kind o f cut across thAm. He w~s- ass-;i:gne.d a,s- kj:nd of 
a pe:i:sona, l adviser to Lodr;e a,nd then he staye d therP.. fo.'I'.' ,a•t•hile.. B11t he 
didn't have a :!:rograrn to run, and so he w3 s-n't a pro0ram mana,ger. Everynody 
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'WEC: else ".ATa.S r unn ing programs, and he was an idea ma n a nd a cri t-ic . And 
the p:eople running pro']'rams would be very je~lolls of the ir rela tionship witn 
their V;te.t names·e co1mterparts, and when anothe r Arner 1' can wonld come in f rom 
the side, w·ould c onfnse both the Vi e t namAse and the A.me,,...ica ns i'iS to just who 
wa s running the raiJ roa d . 
CBC: Uhn hunh. 
WEC ~ And that's why th;a,t m:i_ ssi oJ?.-I th;tnk ;it d;i:d s ome. y e:xy useful th-inki ng .- had 
some inte recting i:deas, it ne,_,er ']'Ot o ff the around in t e rm.c; of proc'luc;tng 
Because 
wha,t he produced for Magsa ysay. x:x/he d i dn't: have tha,t kind of s tructure when 
he wa,s with Magsaysay or he had the CIA .to use as hi s progi:-i:1,m ~ as- h;ts progra,rr-_, 
But 
and he could reach in and get some money and us'.? it :F.or that . /in the period 
in Saigon he didn't r e ally have a program ... (pause) relat ed to the Ambassador 
;:ind the Vietnamese wer e a litt le c onfused as to where he fit into the s c heme 
o f it. 
CBC: I t. bot hers me a little bit , I guess, unless r tot-al l y m5:sunder str1.nd 
him , he was a man wit h a good tra ck record , who comes into Vie tnam at thi s 
point to try to figure out some way t-,o t r y to help the situation get better 
r::tthe r t han just: stutb=>r a l ong from bad to wor.se . Yet almost everybod:'{ 
resented him , and you 're tal king t o me about. , . 
WEC: Did you e.ver see Bob Komer' s p i ece about "Bureaucrac y Does Its Thing" ? 
CBC: Yes, I have. Yeah. 
WP.C: I t's all there . 
CBC : Bob Komer is one o f t hose who despis ed l ,ans dale . 
WEC: Wel l, h e s aw him a:=: competiti ve . For obvious r e a,snns·, he , •• 
CBC : Phi l Hab:il, you know ..• 
WEC : They had very comparable obligations . 
CBC: Uhn hunh, 
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WEC: ... and yet Bob was running a majnr progr am and he couldn't: see just 
how L~nsdale fit into it and .. . 
CBC: But d i'd he want to see how Lansdale fit i nt0 it? I think: tnot 1 s 




welJ, you have bureaucratic ... the turf wa:i--s that exist anywhere. ••. 
Oh, we have them at the University . .. 
Yeah, I rec,li7.e tf)at . . ,Univer~iti"es have as ma.n!' a,s Flnynody •• • 
cor por ati ons., .it isn't just a government p r oblem. 
But the pyobl em is that Lansdal e I s ass igrn:nent a,t tfo,,_t pP.;riod was fairly 
fuzzy , he d;i.dn 't have a cl.ear-c1-1t missi on , and it was- sort of, go ove.-r and f.;i::pd 
somethir>g u~ef11L Well, everyboc'ly wa s· bus-ily engaged in Program 'A, Program R r 
P;t;og:r;'am C, Prog;t;am D and each though t that those prog1:;ams were terr;tbly uS'f'fuJ ., . 
and to find hiJ"n sor t of on the outside, ynu knowr wandering around it ~ made 
them v ery uncomfortable. 
CBC: WeJ l, I-0dqe even tells- hi.m at one point, stop going out ;i.n the. 
c ountrys;i.de , Don't t a lk c:lirectly with Viet namese. Bu t that was PJ.s· genius. 
WEC: Yeah. Su:r;e, 
CBC~ Uh.,, 
WEC~ Well, what should he,v e been done was, he should ~ve been b1;ought into 
one. 0:f; the vro9;rams . I mea,n by the time t he program got suff;i.cien.tlv articulated, 






Was he there during ... he was there duri ng TET. That' s ri<;ht·, he. ~s. 
I t hiDk hP le~t •.• 
~o it must have been · '·•· 69. 
r th.ink he le:f;t not long i;l,fter that . 
TThn hunh, 
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WRC: He left ... pacifiGation ~rogram was . getting 
going .. , 
CBC: He was: telling TT1e ahout some Lt. Col. , ArJT1y collli
nnnder sometimP- duving 
TET, who was tryi ng to find some Viet Cong in some of
 t!le a::!:'ea.s of toW!' and 
he .-•as using artillery t o bla st r3part these che ap litt
le shanties, c1.nd Lansdale 
s;1id that he remonstrated with the Col. that those pe
ople have spent months 
and ·months h 11 ;tld i .nc; thos,e shanties, and you are just b
lowi:rog them i'l.part i n a 
m"'.tter of minutes, e,nd the:i::-e are Viet Cong in onlv on
e of those house s anyway . 
So he felt very frustrated with that kind of military
 response . 
WEC: And you can understand wha t the military wou
ld then say. 
CBE:: Oh, yes. 
WEC~ ;r mean: this Lr. Cnl. . battery . .• bc,ttal.;i:.on command
e;i;,, ':',nd he;t'e comes 
a.n A;i..r Force Major General --which he was by then .. . 
CBC: He would have been by thnt time _. yes,. 
WEC: , ,.in on him a.nd talking a.bout dontt knock
 thos-e buildj::,ngs daW11, 
a.Pd ht=>. ' s qot his orde:t's from his division commander to move thr
ough that area, 
you know .•• ;Lt's fo,irly typical of the p!'.'obl ems he wou
ld get into ,. 
CBE:: Uhn hunh. 
WEC ; • . . because. he. really wasn't pa.rt of it, y0u 
know'. If a, staff of;f; :lcer 
of t-he divi sion came. down, could say, oh, come on .. ,h
e wo11ld be fitting in with. 
tbe organizat;t0naJ. events, But when Lansdal e came in
 fraim thP outside, you 





T me"'n, I'm not just;i:fying it but it ;is a f a.ct o f life
 .. 
I: unde.rstand. 
Lansdale sai d that a fter that pa,rtic11la,r incident r the
. Vietnamese. 
w:tth. whom he. ha,d worked for years Rad:,n, we doY!' t wa,nt any 
American +:o c0me 
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CBC: in saying anything to us. It had reallv disappoin ted thP-m. :n.nd 
of cours e, he carries that same k j nd of d i sappoi ntment even now,. / 
Well, I was talkin<] about a nameless Army Lt. Col . battalion comma.nder--
f or a long time LansdaJe wa s just an Air Force Lt . Col. , and I'm not sure just 
how- such. t hings work. Maybe yoi.1 can hel p me out on this . He talks aoo11t 
comi~g ba ck f rom the Phili;_:,pines rt s a Lt. Col. He hadn 't s een his wife He len 
wi th 
fo ,,. awh;i.le, so / her an<'l the boys, they we11t o f f on a Florida va,cat ion, and only 
a day or so after they had gotten tn Flnrida, he s ays. he was .interrupted. by A. 
te l ephone call f rom John Foste r Dulles. Now. he won't expla in t hat, but, you 
see._. I'm also a Lt. Col. in the Army Reserves s o I had some idea of the lar, k 
of worth of ~omebody of that r a nk--what is t h e Secretar y o f St~te , wnnse b rot he~ 
? 
is a gai na'E CIA, d0ing calling d i rec tl;,7 a Lt. Col.? 
WEr. ~- Well , I c c1 n e nvisage that. ,John would have been p r oud of what. he. did 
tn 
i_n the Philippines and he 90s!';:ibly . . . we t olhght. to list e nkhis: guy; hei!'c got some 
y ery intere~ting ideas and expe rience. I know . .. I had an incident that I just 
casually menti0ne<l in the book, speci fi c;ally nameless ; whP-re I was given a ver y 
s e cret agent to ruJ'l ,, whn had been in the countr y for quite awhile , a nd I didn •t 
know· anythJ ng .:ibont him .. . and I di s covered in h is background , h~ us~d t o 
wander in the country and make h i s i nqu i ries and go ba0k. On one. occa.sion he 
was· :::,icked up on a street corne r by a 1 i..mousine wi th Alle n and Fos:ter i n i t . •• 
CBC : Oh~ my. 
WEC: And hB brie.fed them both. Now I about lost my mind . That's the wrong 
way to run the intell.i gence ~ervice. 
CRC: TTnh hunh. 
WEC : Raw mate r;i.;i l and r aw opini on <;oing smack in at t he polic y lE=wel . But 
w-i th. t hat bac kg1:cound, I can understand e a sil y how- Fos:ter might h9,ve called him . , 
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CBC: Arid . sai·d, we have this crisis .• • 
WEC: Because fre'1uently, you know, the people at t he policy 1 evel, they 
get so much refined stuff that they are dying tc get a straight account from 
somebody. Pr esident Kennedy used to rip open .the cables from th.e field and 
".'ea<l thPm befor e they went- through the refining. I think wear a ltttle 
more sophistica.ted now, but. •• b11t, ther e is thcit hunger a t the top level to 
get a real feel of what's happenin<J. 
CBC: Wel l , wA'vf'>, tal ked several t i mes about his r ole int-he Philipp;i.nes. 
Are you able to talk about what help CIA offered him i n the Philippi nes? 
WEC: I just don' t knnw. I was in Europe a t t½.at t ime . All I know· is 
l 
8ort of the aurora of it:. He hel ped Magsaysa~:. He may ha,ve been substa.ntiall v 
responsihle f or identifying hJ m as a comer, and then esta,blish his eleGtor a.l 
ca.mpa.ign. 
CBC~ wen, I picked this ur ver y • • . 
WEC; But I don't know. I don't know that of direct knowledge. It 1 s a,11 
hea:rsa.y. 
CBC~ I picked thj<s u::::, spottily tha t p r inting plant~ th;i.t wel;'e p;r,inting 
ballots for the oppositiorr suAdenly found themselve.s. haying mechanicaJ. problems, 
wi th. the occas;ional fire.; he h2.d peopl e with som<=> money . .• 
WEC: Well, >'}OW, now, Lansdale, h_is real contributi:.on was his positive 
th.tnking where he thi.nks, you know: why don 't you make the appeal along the 
following l inPs. Why don't you develop a song that the cadr e cnn sJ'ng to 
identify thPm. There he's r\ genius. 
CB:C: I' think that's true. 
WEC: Where he really puts his foot in i .t is some o f thase fun and g-ame s 
di'rty tri cks, which. is par t of what comes out in the Pent agon pape.!:'s about ••. 
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CBC: . .. the Saigon military . ~ . > ; ';.? 
WEC: No ... 
CBC: Lou Conein up there destroying the buses nf Hanoi? 
WEC: No, no . . . I mean that, ~,.rou knot.--? ... that isn 'it. going- to do anythin,:;. 
Those of us who have heen in that kind of OP''~ration know- that thos e tbi.ngs 
really are . . . once in awhile they kind of work, but usually are a bloody nui.S:ance, 
But the really ,rositive action can be of enormous .... 
C'BC• Uhn hunh. 
WEC: And thA,t' s where Lansdale' s real contribution is, triat he can think 
of something li.ke thi s. 
CBC: Uhn hunh. 
NEC: He got i nterested in some poet in Vietnam; singe,r ~md 9oet a,nd, you 
know. brought him u~; m-3de .:a thi_ng out of hi:.m. People began to i.denti:.fy witfL 
him , Well, that's good, because it gets someborly thinkinq positive . Ral lying 
strength, gat:herinq strength. Psychologically, politically: whatever. 
But going out and blowinsr up streetcar,c:; .. , doesn't help 3.t all. 
CBC : I've been a littlA amused about that. Ac cordi.ng to severa,l sources 
that I have talked with, prior to migrat.:Lon rrcnn north. to the Snuth Vietnam, 




And Lan so a.le sai.d, hey, let' s really enco1.1rasre these people . They 





And the saJ'l'le man who hAlps them think about large nnmbPrs r1nd/t ur0. s 
a:round c1,nd tries to s.:a_bot-:'lge ·the gas tanks or city buses-.,. 
WEC: Yeah. 
CBr.: It's a stranqe ... di' sjuncture, •. 
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WEC: Well, beca11Se - . , there was that 2eriod when we got into it wher e 
we think, well, by God, do something to them. And I ran the parachute 
operations into North Vietnam for awhi]e, and I came to the conclusions that 
the y - werP. effectless. We weren't get tiDg anywhere . And I "t"ecommended 
they be dr opped. It was just when we t urned that whole proji;:.ct over to the 
militr1ry, and the mil itri_ry were out there going, welL by God ; we'll do it 
the right way: we'll do a lot of it and it will have an impact •• • 
CBC: Uhn hunh, 
WEC: There is this: we have to do to them what they've done to u s kirid 
o-F phi losophy, instead of pickin9 a positive strategy and then going with it. 
CBC: Well , he helped convince some of the :b.ot brri nds (.?} in the Philippines· 
that the best way to work with the Huks was to take their pr ogr am awa,y from 
them . 
WEC: Ye.a,h, sul'.'.'e, Better 1cevolution than, . . 
CBC: That' :right. That's right. 
You know he hel:;;,ed . •• 
WEC: The way to s to::; guerri llas i s not to shoot 1 ero; i t 1 s to r ecr u;tt 'em 0 
ThB,t 1 !=: how you eliminated gnerr illas. 
CBC: Woulrl_ you shake ha.nds with ? , college py,ofessor? 
(Laughter 1 
WEC: Tha,tts , my line. Bi?.en t hat way forever .•• 
CBC: I re.ally am 'rery mu1:h in support Qi; th;.:it position. 
W"'.....C; Abs:olut ely; no douht about i t. You know we talk:ed ;:ibo1,t, I'm res;ponS'±hle 
of course, 
for the Phoenix rroc.:ram / but it wasn I t any program of ki.lling men . What i t WFi.s 
try;i:ng to do was identify who they v.rerP so t hat the y co11.ld be. captu;red , • • 
CBC': . . . interr ogated. , • 
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convinced to rally or 
·WEc: .• , anc'l if necessary, shot out: .. . but the deaths were deaths primarily 
i.n. fights outside the vi'llage i'lnd which our people u~ed to compla,;tn about . 
They said, look, you are crediting all the!=:e people killls'!d, end they were just 
killed i n regular military actinn; they weren't killed in anything +-lia,t-. Plioenix 
did. Our officers used to be sort of about it; they fi';Ured they 
were gone but we had their names erirlie.r and they hadn't rallied and they 
hadri.' t been cartured 2".nd they were killed. That's ,_.rhat happened to tl'i.em . After 
we fnund one, that's what ha.p::::,ened t0 them. But the real thing that happened 
was the North.Vietnamese , rather strange thing now, credited the Phoenix progra.-m 
with eno:rmnus effectiveness ••. In Tarnow's (.Carnow's) book., . let me think.,. , 
(pausel . But I still think +-ha,+- they have confused the. pac;tficat;t_on pl'.."ogram 
w--ith Phoenix; that the. pacifici;i,tion program was a li:l.rger p;i;iogri'Jsm, •. 
CBC: Uhn Inmh..., 
WEC: . , . involved J ocal elections and getting local_ gove~nmfmt soing and 
tn...e. ;t'Pfw:_ree resettlement p:rogr.am; · all those- were part of the pric;t-fi_cAt;i:pn 
program , and there i s absolutely no doubt about it, bebveen • 6-.---.-oh., mus·t be 
earlv '69 and the end of , a.bout 1 72 , yon pretty well stri2pe.d thE> country of 
guerrillas, -but you di_dn't shoot 'em; yo11 recruited 'em. 
CRr: Uhn hunh.. 
WEC: Well , we !=:et up a self defense Cl"'rp , peoples: s,elf cl.efense forcer 
and tne id"'a. was tha,t people contribute to gua,!'din g the.;r..r home. town, horne. 
vi'llage. A,nd they spend one night a week, b-ro n i ghts. a. wee.."<. on gi.1.a,rd . 
CBC: Uhn hunh. 
. 
WEC; .•• the kid~ in th.P nej'.qhborhood, keep a batch. of r i fles an.d hand 
them out: i.n the. e.veninq i;l,nd pir.k them up j'_n the morning.. Pass the.m around tne 
next night . They dori 't ray them and they ei.r e not soldiers; t1'...e.y don't f .,' ght 
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W8C: very well; you don't expect them to. But what you did, I m~an, r 
personally have d r iven through the countryside at midnisrn:t , t;'lt1ts·µ'le. of Hue 
on Chr,' .stmas of 1 70 • • • 
CBC: By yourself .. . 
WEC : With the provinr.e chief, the Bri.ti.sh. Ambr1,s5,ador a,nd ,me ,'n one. jeep. 
One other jeer with a couple of other officers benind, a.no we- went for a r~de. 
at midnight wav out in the country, .. and yo11 dr;i've along and i:n tfie fie.R,dl1' gli:ts 
(uninte Uigibl e) . . , fel l ows up there with guns, which they would have snot 
your head off two y~ars before ... 
CRC: Uhn hunh.. 
WEC: Because you have given thPm guns. We ha.d a b;Lg ar<;Wl}ent ,,bo11 t thi;J,t, 
whether to arm the l0cal communities like th=.t. The a r gument wa,s-, weapons 
will go to the en emy. They ha.ve got all the weapons, they n.eeil, they don't 
need your weapons. The ot.her was thnt we would lose the weapons,. Well, WP- "l l 
lose some, but every man holding on~ of our auns is on our side . And tliatts--, •. 
I said ; you mav lose 20 per cent of the guns; we ar.tu0cllv lost about 3 O't' 4 
per cent. Well, they won I t · fight very wel 1,, That's · right; ~fe don "t expe:ct 
t:hero to . AlJ we want .:;i:.s- to t a ke C'om.rnuni ties that useil to be vulne'.1'.'ahle to 
f i ve men with five pt stols- walking in rtnd · dom,·natin<; the vil lasre, it could no 
longer be entered by five men with five pistol s; they will be sh0t at. And 
their' un;t.t will c ome and thGy will run away. Ftne, it's a:!.l r1' ght w-:i::th.. me., · 
CBC: 
WEC: 
Tt's sort of a civilian self protection program that Fatlier Wah- ran,., 
Yeah, yea.h ; but that was the basis of the strategic hamlet pro9ram. 
We ha,nded out a million guns; no, 500,000, excus-== me, 500.,000. guns , The 
onP :rule, Isa.id, w?1,s· no p r stols . I knew tha,t. in the Philippines, tiianks- t o 
Wor ld Wa.;i; rr, where we dropped the da,mn ? all ove;r the country, tna,t . 
was one 0f the problems with election s and crime an:l evqry+:hi_ng eJ s.e .. A r t flP. 
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WEC: is a good self defense gun , but it
's not a very gond murder weapon 
or crime weapon. 
CBC: Not in a, crowd. 
WEC: No, -t t isn't. So I said all the r ifl
es you wa.nt. Y(')u know, we ha,ve 
got 500,000 of theril--ha.nn them out. But no pisto
ls . A.nd we didn't have, •. 
but the result was we yec:ruit ed these large num
bers of young peo_rle to p r otect 
their communities, which som_e of them thought th
ey we:t'e doinq wflen they i-1ere 
working for the C0mm1_mists. 
CBC: That's rfght. 
Lansdale sa;td, .:it's a very sim::.=-li.fied way of lo
okin9 c,t it, hut I 
thi:_nk i t • s t mport,mt. He says:, in a peopl es •,wa
,r, ycm take tfle people 13,wa,y 
frnm the war. , • 
WEC; sure. 
CBC: ,, ;;id and then a,11 you ha,ve le:l;t are ba,n
di.ts you kiJ 1, 
WEC! Get the peoplP- on your side; <Jet the peo
ple. on your siPE'~ Tnenyou 
ha,ve to kno•..r WW:'_t the structure of th~ enemy is
, the :real a,ppa,T,,.tus· that runs ••• 
that ~s w:hat Phoen.;tx was about. To identi-f:y who
 those are- a,nn pic k them out~ a,nd 
put thPm in the hooseg<:!w 
Q~ get the m to chr=tngP.. And, ·you know, it doe
sn't do any good to, as you say, 
to shoot up a whole lot of shanti es. Tha,t's a 
job, too . Get some evidence as 
to who reports, o f who is the l oc?ll tax collect
or, then get two or three of t:fiem, 
now where, how· often does: he come, where does- h








The Mafia. type. Trace hin1. 
Well, tha,t•s over simpl ified. 
A. Mafia can d0mina,te a. community, 
What no you mea,n can; they do . 
They do , unle$,s you a.id a cornmuni ty a'}ain st t he
m a,nd (b) you ca,n focus 
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on those Mafia members, not the community as a whole. 
Yea,h-, tiie. ;t;ecent court t :r;ia, ls in Na!:)les-, for ins:trince, Mafi" figures , . • 
Yea,h.. 
• •• Jt's a,ctually a ver y brave thing be;i:.ng done, because tiie. , .. 
•. , enormously cou:r::aJ e.011s, • • they lost a, fe-W' g"'ne,,.,i;!,ls on t lia,t, •• 
Uhn hnnh and a few jurlgei:; •• . 
Yeah. But yo11 sti ll ha,ve to fight them. 
Jus t two more. things . 
S11re . 
Why do yo11 think Lansdale fell 1.md"'r such. disfavor du;,:iinsr the Kennedy 
r e girrte and even up into the Johnson regime; perhaps· l'!lore so i'n the J'olim~on 
r egime, a,fter under Ei senhower and ~arly-Kenriedy he had been so well thouglt.t 
of? 
WP.C: Well, he was ••. he is a bit of an unguid ed w-:tssile. ;f;rom the p0tnt o:f; 
view- of the bureauc rar-y, be it militriry or c i vilian. His f3yol" lay at the. 
irregular area when he T•1ork ed for CIA, or when he ""la,s· fl_ p;r;,es:i:dentia,l a,dvi:ser 
with ;tdea,s-. But when the bur ea,ncr.::icy t ook over to run thei:_r progranis-, thi;!,-i:: 
was whe n they were very suspi-c;tnus- of h i m aD.d the Pe-ntagon wa.s, thP- one tfiat 
sai.d .· no tha,!!ks they didn't wa.nt h im t-o be. Ambassador • 
CBC: I heard it was George Ball. 
WEC; we.11, I don { t know who :it was·, 'but a,nywa,y, somebody J i ,k?. tna_t • . , 
to put ;i:nto t ha,t job. He's not an organizer, Well , they :put Cabot Lodge. .in, 
who Also wa,s not: an org-"n;tze.;r: . But he hi;l,d a, diffe.r:ent politi'ca,l ba,r.kg:round; 
he was a. sem'or Republican . Now, I think the bu:r·ea11cracy couldn it fo=i,:ndl e. 
Ed , Th~t they jus-t , . , fu> made them ve;r;y uncomfnrtf!,ble il,nd he. ~o;r;it of i::ut 
,;icross their 1 i:nes of r:o:mrna.nd . CUnintelligj_hle) And they just di:dn it wa.nt 
Side l - Interv;tew with- WilJ iam E. Colby, former CIA Director, at h .ts: home -
24 June 1gg5 = pag~ 23 
/ 
/ 
WEC: him invol,red - Unr'ler the . . then <:ab0t Lodge, who was a n eq
1-1al ma;Ve:;t;;t.ck., 
I me;,,n, Elnd r:ert:ainly no organ iza_tio nal genius, I mean Cahot,· coi.1 ldn •t-. ha,,re 
been less interested i n running a TY1.ission; he was looking a'r'ound f0r tni.ngs 
that nee<led ... articulate them and Lansdale and he were a g0od team _;Ln tfiat 
regard. 
CBC• 
But of oourse, Lodge drove everybody crazy. 
Includi ng Lan~dale. 
(LauglLter) I 
man, and as I say, t-hiq was a huge orgi'l_n;t.zational structur e tha,t wa,~ at worR_ 
out there. And non-organi zational men get grc,1_md 11p in huqe organJz51,t;i::cna,l 
str uctures. / 
CBC: Yo11 are suggesting real l y tha.t he would need 13,nothe;i;, very top lev
e_l , 
powerful protector to hove remaini;,d emfective during thos-a yea,:rs? 
WEC: What he r eally needed was to b'=' put: uncler somE>-body and, .• l i ke mys·elf, 
th::: pacif i cation. thing, arn'l. used as a member of the team, but us:eo_ fo:r h;i::s--
talents there, I guess. You know, Bob Thomps:on had the same p>:obl em . Tfie_ 
Br:i' tish aclviser . 
CBC; Yes, 
WEC : He had exactly the s-a.me p roblem. He was. 0utsi.de th.e- }?;t;ocedu;i:;e, r 
C 
q0t a long extremely wP,11 wi.th Bob, even though_ we- d ±s:a,greed cm s:om,e; tn;i::ngs, 
it didn't ma tter. r thought he was an absolute genius in the contriout-;t:on 
he !!lade to 0ur efforts the re. But military just cou ldn 't stand h i m; the .. polic
e' 
program was up the wall everytime he opened his mouth, He would go in and 
b '.!;ief the. President or Henry and hrllf the burei'lucr acy would qu;t.ye:r _ I thou<Jl:l..t 
he was great:. 
But that's wha,t he needed, was: to be brought .t,nto i'l srtem s:omewher~ , 
so that he could be u$,e d as a. senior s t aff officer, a senior id<:-a man, . , 
Cli~.DE 1 END~ )-
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WEC: B11t the i.dea being that you have to get those
 ideas and thenfu:;i::ng 
them 1nto a pro']ram or into a structul'.'e s o tha,t they then c
0uld come- down 
through the proper staff • .• 
I 
CBC: I think that's very insightful beca us.e when he was t .n
 the Pfij:J .tI?ptnes,, 
he was an idPa man for Magsaysc,i_y who had the staff, wb.o fie_d t
he prog:rii3;ffi who 
could expedite it ... 
WEC : Yeah. Who could put it toqether. 
CBC: And :j:t worked very well. 
WEC ~ Yea.h. 
r'BC: In Vietna!!' ..• , 
WEC': We have had a. l ot of lone operators, C;tA, ty?e
{>, who h9;ve e.sta,nl :i::shed 
tha,t ki' nd of a ver y good personal relationship with. a chie.f of
 gove"'.'nment or 
foreign roljtical figure. And by a n enormous empathy of th
e- kind that Lansqale 
has and basic s upport, been able •. . and don't rea.d 'em offj:c
;tal U. S • policy 
every morning; you know, just be out there., be obviously, I'm not
 speaking 
for the offici:al U.S. governmerit; here is just an ide.3. fo r 
you. N0w-, then 
the tri ck of the trade is to m;c,ke sure thnt he is not displ
acing the. Ambassador . 
And the way we f i nally worked out to do that was separatel y
 WP- coordinated 
the ,n..n,b.;i_ss;c,doi:: ) ,s o that Ambassador knovrn that he is in cha,,
,ge , A.nd tfiis· is 
the tool. Now a good Ambassador cAn use somethiDg like tha
t with enornoous 
effect and say th3ngs that he as Ambass?dor can't say and hear thin
gs that 
u 
he as ~.,mb.;,_ss-"' · or shouldn't he3.r. .And i t's a wonderf1-1l one-two re
lationshJ' p, 
depending on c0nvtncing the Amba ssador that he is in char<Je.
 A.nd we have ha,d 
a, number of those work ~rerv successfully, and we've had som
e ,~,fie.re the CI'A 
guy thou']ht tha,t he was the Amb2=,ssa dor and then you ge-t an 
enormous.: :Ug!it 
r i ght a.way. 
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W'RC: else talk to th~ Chief of State. Then it does,n 't work, 
CBC: T,anc::dal e was: so much. on his ow:n in the Phtli:ppi:nes ~nd ect:r;ly on t n 
VJ'etna;m r so much on his own; thc1.t, you know, people like:. I:r;,on 'Mi:k.e j ust so:rt 





Could .. . 
But wnen you get into the hea,l:t of; a proq!,l;'a,m, off, e1, JTl;'; jO:"..' p;i:;,og:oa,!l), 
/ 
CBC: co, ild you baye contr0lled Lansdale., i .f he. nad been as·si:gned to wo;i;ik 
fo;i;i you? 
WEC: Def;tni:tely. Yeah .• 
CBC; Do you thi.nk he would ha,ve wor ked hapJ?i:ly? 
WEC ~ I 0 got along extI.'emel y well with. John )?aul Vi:1,nn ($p?l. a_nd ne. ~s, a,n 
eq1Ja,l :maverick, .• 
CBC: Oh, yes., yes, . 
WEC:, Vann finally c::a,m~ to me. at one. po;tnt and said, you kno'W', :r: be.lie.ve 
/ 
so much i:n th.is program thqt. I:'m actually <JQi:ng to keep my -rno1.1tfL !"hut i3,fuut ±t , 
(La,11gh.ter) 
WEr': I sa,i.d., 00-r co!Tle on, John • • , 
(Laughter). 
CBC: That: 's very inter~stt ng. 
WEC: But .• • ym~ th.ink he'd listen to them, (unintelligible 1. 
Don't get ha,n'}ups. Some people rlo gPt h;=mgups. But wha.t 
i.t ta,kes i s the rolP of an ·a17t.tst, the role of a. genius It's a tough busi ness 
and not always gets t-he recognition it shnuld ha,.re and f r eq11.ent-ly qets the 
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WEC: opposition. You know great artists are like this. The 
establi shments move against them when they come uo with new ideas . The art 
wo~td i s accusto~ed to waiting fifry yP.ars for them to prove out , 





By that t:i_me : of coul'.'se, the arr-ist is dead. 
Yeah , he I s- dead. But nonetheless his a.:i:'t • • • 
I think the artist would l ike the recogniti on dul;' i ng hi:s- li:fe.,, . 
I think sc. 
Oh, yea,h. / 
S11re . But the good artist i s go.i'ng to p J:;od12ce 9;ooa art a nd count 
on it showing some day . And Ed is one of those , 
CBC: I have heard that duri ng the Eisenhowe,., administri=l,tt on , All.en null e.s, 
and ,John Foster suaaested t o Et senhower that La~sd.:ale be sent . .. . be me.de 
~mbaSS'l'ldor in Vietnam. Have you ever. her1rd that story? 
WEC: Well , only that his vis i t in the end of the Eis~nhower thing was that 
he might become Ambassador. I don't know. You mean during the '50 1 s? 
CBC: Yes. 
WEC: 50 1 s period. I 
CBC; The middle '50 1 s , 
WEC : I heard that story . " .I just don't kno\v', 
CBC: I've heard it f r om two different sour ces and I thouqht I'd try it out 
on you. 
WEC: I just wouldn't know. 
CBC· OK, lastly, Mr. Colby. Seel' haven't confused you once today, 
(Laughter ) 
l' felt like s,11ch a fooll Such a t0tal fool.! 
WEC: Oh~ no , don't he silly . 
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CBC: I thought maybe you smiled in yonr letter. 
(Laughter) 
If he had become A.mbassador. do vou think. things· in Vietna,m mi_glit 
have taken a, different cnurse beci"!,use of his sup:rort for the Di.em regime? 
Anot he:".' way to ask tha,t. , c0uld the Diem regi:me hc1.ve 111an.,,.ged to improve W';L:tfL 
p r.aper tutelage? 
WEC: No, I don't think sn. I thi.nk. the. Diem :regJme0 • • I tI:iink_ tI:ia D;teni 
re0imA was doing 3,bou t as well a,s it would a,nd actui\lly it wa,s better tI:ia,n 
-most regimes t-ha,+- f0.ll0wed . Th?,t indeed when Th.t.eu f i;nally out his regime 
togic:>tner, he made no secret of the fact 'that hP essent;i:.a,lly r an the. c0untry 
;i::n the same way that Di:em did . 
CBC:-: Uhn hunh. 
WEC: He thought that was the way it onght to be run, A.nd r: a.g:ree,, r 
you know, the thi ng that destroyed the Diem regime was the. ratner intense 
poli'tical attack on Diem , a,nd the simpli sti:c concept that only by· betng 
a. real democrat could he fight off the Communists . 
CBC: Uhn hu11h. 
WEC: Which reaJ.ly i s i .l'.'relevant. I mea,n , tha,tts not the ~a,y to f'J9ht 
off the Commun.;i:sts . The WcW to fight off the Cnmmnnists: is thro11gii strateg;tc 
hamlets, so me forrn of pacifira,tj•on program. Now· if you say tha,t if L;:msda,le 
ha,d been there and had put our maximum support behind str8 .. teqic ha,mlets in 
'62 .and carrierl it on, he would not have been ;::ible to "".1.tfag.ta,nd the upnea;v,':'!,l 
o f tht> da,ys C,?l That picture of t:he Bonze on tlie, front-. 
pa~e o f Ltfe Magazine did it. Nothing could wi:tfist~nd i t Kennedy 
couldn tt do j:t. Now·, now we think of tho$e Banze that ~an tn~t ~s -
essent;i.allv doing to Di em whqt thP Artolla,1:L KohmeJ'ni. <'ltd to tfie $fia,h. 
CBC: Uhn linnfi., uhx1 , hunfi , 
•. 
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WEC= He took a reasonably good regime ... 
CBC: ... and he .•. I 
WEC: ••. destJ'.'oyed it and thBn r epla,ced it with a m11cI1- wol;'se one. I 
mean, that 's essenti ally what hap9ened there. Now', you 're not s'cl,y;tn<; it ts-
a perf ect regim<::' by;=; long shot, but the Diem regime •. • if we ha,d focused on 
the war a nd t-he ::_:,eoples' wa r nnture of it, then it's my belief that :it coulc'l. 
ha,ve poss-ibl v been stop9ed about '65--' 64 .• -vigorous push- of t hes e st:t'a tegi:c 
hamlets and puttin? them tngether and correcting the eJ'.'l'.'ors. But we had the 
rig-ht strategy. The Communists knRw that . They have. said so . They knew •• • 
Wilfred 
you know Burchett's comment , that 1962 belnnged to the govepnment , Belonged 
ta the government, They picked up the program and pushing and ha,d the 
;initiative in the battle . / 
CBC: That's really tellinq. That's a year before the assassination. 
WEC: Yeah. Yeah, / 
CBC: Lansdale kePps saying that the wor st problem wasn't the assass;inat:.ion 
on Diem and the coup but the fr1ct that after Diein was assassinated, t he duly 
elected consti tutional vice president wasn't allowed to step into the offi ce . 
WEC: But he was hopeless. 
CBC: But when you rno11e away from the Constitution 
WEC: He djdn' t, he coulr'In' t .. . even fact reality. Tho. 
CBC: I don't even remember who the guy was . What's his name? 
WEC: Tho. T H 0 
CBC: Oh. 
He was a nice gentleman. He actually tur ned up in one of the later 
governments. 
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CBC: Ok: I guess those are all the questions I have. 
WEC: Well, you have got a very interesting subject and I a.rn sure you 
. I tnJnk. 
w-:i:11 do it very well. He ;i..s a very interesting f P.llow,/ If you look. on ;i..t: 
a.s· t0 how do you .. . ho••" do you oeal with a maverick-artist .in a la,rsre 
;i..nstitutional bureaucracy; that's the r:r:;oblem. And there aren't any P.asy 
answers. 
CBC: No there aren 't . And yet we need them both. 
WEI"'. ~. Yes, we no. We need the large insti.tutions, we need the discipline 
tha,t they have. We also need the geniuses. How do you pa,tch. them togethe.1;? 
CBC: I probably won't come up with an eternal answer. 
WEC: Well, I'm trying to ... one thing I'm doing with. my book i s to say that 
Bob Komer , I think, had a gl i mm0 r of how you do it, wh.i.ch. is., you ad h0c ;i..t. 
You see, instead of using the institution s a!': they are se.t, you a,d hoc a 
structure for the rroject, and then you nraw the. support from the. othe-r 
agencies, involve them in some ad hoc management, that's what people don't 
understand about these things. 
CBC: That I s very muclt like Franklin Delano Roosevelt • • . 
WEC: Yeah. 
CBC: , .• approach. the New Deal , 
WEC: Oh, yAah .. whenever he ha.d somet-.hing that wa,sn 1 t wo;r,king he. would fo;t;I!} 
.=i, ne""" agency. 
CBC: That's right, 
WEC: And he cl.idn't care if it contradicted four times wi th. t hj::ngs tiia,t 
were alre,;idy c:roing on ••• He just, you know .. , 
CBC: One o f his biographers said that Roosevel t h i'!,d no long..-.te;t;::n v.t:s:t:on, 
On any given six .... month problem 1 he ha,d a :=dx-cmonth. answe;i;, 
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WEC: Well, r think, once vou have fonned a bureauocrar::y, ~,7ou have got 
all the ills of it, and mayb8- yo12 do we ll not to. , . I mean, people say why 
cnulrln tt we instituticmalize the (unintell igible). No way . It wou ld become 
a dull bureaucracy, too, Form a new one. 
CBC: How do I get into Vietnam? I have been writing to those mis:era,ble 
people f o r a year. 
WEC: Spe~k to Ka,rnow He got there, 
CBC: YRa.h-, he did. 
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